The Context and the International Drivers of Surveillance in the Southern African Development Community
Authors: Ernesto Nhanale and Rui Verde
May 2023
This report is a first attempt to present an overview of the facilitating context and the main private international drivers of digital surveillance in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Based on interviews and various materials produced in each country, the report looks at the factors dictating electronic surveillance in SADC countries and maps hypotheses, and indications about the type of international actors that promote mass surveillance technologies in the SADC, including what problems are common and which are the most frequent actors. The report identifies several international actors that have been playing a decisive role in the supply and adaptation of the most sophisticated technologies. The important conclusion is twofold: there would be no effective electronic surveillance in SADC without the assistance of companies form other foreign countries. And, as far as it is perceptible, private companies are increasingly occupying a prominent role in external collaboration regarding the provision and training in electronic surveillance technologies which is clearly dangerous.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Authors: Ernesto Nhanale and Rui Verde
May 2023
This report is a first attempt to present an overview of the facilitating context and the main private international drivers of digital surveillance in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Based on interviews and various materials produced in each country, the report looks at the factors dictating electronic surveillance in SADC countries and maps hypotheses, and indications about the type of international actors that promote mass surveillance technologies in the SADC, including what problems are common and which are the most frequent actors. The report identifies several international actors that have been playing a decisive role in the supply and adaptation of the most sophisticated technologies. The important conclusion is twofold: there would be no effective electronic surveillance in SADC without the assistance of companies form other foreign countries. And, as far as it is perceptible, private companies are increasingly occupying a prominent role in external collaboration regarding the provision and training in electronic surveillance technologies which is clearly dangerous.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| sadc_final_report_[90].pdf |
The current state of civil society and activist movements working around natural resources in the DRC in the era of increasing digital surveillance
Authors: Trésor Maheshe Musole and Jean-Paul Mushagalusa Rwabashi
May 2023
This report examines access to civic space by civil society organizations to monitor natural resource governance in the DRC. In order to be a vector for sustainable development, the exploitation of natural resources must be followed by careful monitoring, both in terms of its traceability and the allocation of the resources generated. In the DRC, civil society actors exercise this control over the political and economic actors concerned. However, this practice is met with resistance from economic and political actors. The latter exercise increased surveillance over the activities of civil society organizations. This surveillance can take the form of phone tapping, profiling, website blocking, spying, etc. This paper examines the extent to which this surveillance impacts on the democratic space around natural resource exploitation.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Authors: Trésor Maheshe Musole and Jean-Paul Mushagalusa Rwabashi
May 2023
This report examines access to civic space by civil society organizations to monitor natural resource governance in the DRC. In order to be a vector for sustainable development, the exploitation of natural resources must be followed by careful monitoring, both in terms of its traceability and the allocation of the resources generated. In the DRC, civil society actors exercise this control over the political and economic actors concerned. However, this practice is met with resistance from economic and political actors. The latter exercise increased surveillance over the activities of civil society organizations. This surveillance can take the form of phone tapping, profiling, website blocking, spying, etc. This paper examines the extent to which this surveillance impacts on the democratic space around natural resource exploitation.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| drc_final[90].pdf |
Public Space Surveillance and Protection of Privacy: The Case of Botswana
Author: Tachilisa Badala Balule
May 2023
The use of video surveillance in public space in Botswana, especially by public entities, is slowly gaining footing. It has several benefits such as investigating incidents that may involve criminal behaviour. While public space surveillance has several benefits, it also poses a risk of interfering with individuals’ daily lives by violating their fundamental rights and freedoms. One of the rights at risk due to the widespread routine use of video surveillance is privacy. There is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which fall within the scope of private life. Thus, even when in a public space, a person has a reasonable expectation of some privacy. This paper critically assesses the use of video surveillance in public space in Botswana to determine whether it is used within a framework that adequately balances the right to privacy and competing interests served by surveillance.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Tachilisa Badala Balule
May 2023
The use of video surveillance in public space in Botswana, especially by public entities, is slowly gaining footing. It has several benefits such as investigating incidents that may involve criminal behaviour. While public space surveillance has several benefits, it also poses a risk of interfering with individuals’ daily lives by violating their fundamental rights and freedoms. One of the rights at risk due to the widespread routine use of video surveillance is privacy. There is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which fall within the scope of private life. Thus, even when in a public space, a person has a reasonable expectation of some privacy. This paper critically assesses the use of video surveillance in public space in Botswana to determine whether it is used within a framework that adequately balances the right to privacy and competing interests served by surveillance.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| botswana_final_report[21].pdf |
Surveillance of Digital Communications in Botswana: An Assessment of the Regulatory Legal Framework
Author: Tachilisa Badala Balule
February 2022
This report examines the surveillance of digital communications content and data in Botswana. Such surveillance can be a necessary and effective tool for legitimate law enforcement or intelligence purposes. The flipside of this development is that the use of communications technologies has also enhanced the capacity of governments to conduct surveillance in the form of interception of communications and data collection on individuals.
Weak regulatory environments provide fertile ground for arbitrary and unlawful communications surveillance by States, and the report examines whether such an enviroment exists in Botswana and the implications for privacy.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Tachilisa Badala Balule
February 2022
This report examines the surveillance of digital communications content and data in Botswana. Such surveillance can be a necessary and effective tool for legitimate law enforcement or intelligence purposes. The flipside of this development is that the use of communications technologies has also enhanced the capacity of governments to conduct surveillance in the form of interception of communications and data collection on individuals.
Weak regulatory environments provide fertile ground for arbitrary and unlawful communications surveillance by States, and the report examines whether such an enviroment exists in Botswana and the implications for privacy.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| botswana_report.pdf |
Digital Surveillance and Privacy in DRC: Balancing National Security and Personal Data Protection
Authors: Tresor Maheshe Musole and Jean-Paul Mushagalusa Rwabashi
February 2022
This report explores the state of digital surveillance and privacy in order to locate a possible balance between national security and personal data protection in the DRC. The study describes and documents the actors, practices and targets of such surveillance and analyses their compliance with international human rights instruments binding on the DRC. It also identifies the perceptions of various actors of these practices and the means they have developed to counter this digital surveillance. More specifically, the study seeks to find out whether the Congolese state uses technological means of surveillance, the motives behind its use and the consequences. Based on the data obtained from the interviewees, the study formulates a series of recommendations addressed to the Congolese state (political, intelligence and administrative institutions), to telecommunications companies, to the victims of espionage practises, to civil society and to human rights NGOs for digital surveillance that reconciles national security and human rights.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Authors: Tresor Maheshe Musole and Jean-Paul Mushagalusa Rwabashi
February 2022
This report explores the state of digital surveillance and privacy in order to locate a possible balance between national security and personal data protection in the DRC. The study describes and documents the actors, practices and targets of such surveillance and analyses their compliance with international human rights instruments binding on the DRC. It also identifies the perceptions of various actors of these practices and the means they have developed to counter this digital surveillance. More specifically, the study seeks to find out whether the Congolese state uses technological means of surveillance, the motives behind its use and the consequences. Based on the data obtained from the interviewees, the study formulates a series of recommendations addressed to the Congolese state (political, intelligence and administrative institutions), to telecommunications companies, to the victims of espionage practises, to civil society and to human rights NGOs for digital surveillance that reconciles national security and human rights.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| drc_report.pdf |
Israeli Involvement in Electronic Surveillance in Angola: A Step Towards Transparency or the Sophistication of Illegal Practices?
Author: Rui Santos Verde
February 2022
Several interactions between retired Israeli intelligence officials and the Angolan power elite and armed forces cadres have occurred since the 1990s. The purchase of sophisticated surveillance materials and the intervention of Israeli businesspeople and private companies for the purposes of intelligence collection or security operations have been a mark of these collaborations. Over the past two decades, there has been a deepening of Israeli collaboration with Angola’s intelligence services and elites. This report aims to identify the main Israeli operators in electronic security and surveillance in Angola and briefly explain the history of their involvement. It considers whether their intervention in the country has helped to bring surveillance operations more in line with the law and good practice or if, instead, their approach has been politically neutral and related to business objectives (i.e. profit), thus in practice offering a more sophisticated but not necessarily legal way to enable the use in Angola of the most advanced information technologies. Finally, it seeks to understand the reasons for the Israeli interference in Angola.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Rui Santos Verde
February 2022
Several interactions between retired Israeli intelligence officials and the Angolan power elite and armed forces cadres have occurred since the 1990s. The purchase of sophisticated surveillance materials and the intervention of Israeli businesspeople and private companies for the purposes of intelligence collection or security operations have been a mark of these collaborations. Over the past two decades, there has been a deepening of Israeli collaboration with Angola’s intelligence services and elites. This report aims to identify the main Israeli operators in electronic security and surveillance in Angola and briefly explain the history of their involvement. It considers whether their intervention in the country has helped to bring surveillance operations more in line with the law and good practice or if, instead, their approach has been politically neutral and related to business objectives (i.e. profit), thus in practice offering a more sophisticated but not necessarily legal way to enable the use in Angola of the most advanced information technologies. Finally, it seeks to understand the reasons for the Israeli interference in Angola.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| angola_report.pdf |
Chinese Digital Infrastructure, Smart Cities and Surveillance in Zambia
Author: Sarah Chiumbu
February 2022
Zambia has embarked on smart city projects. The government has established a three-phase project towards reaching the smart city status: establishment of national data and cloud capabilities; creation of advanced digital communication infrastructure, and putting in place Cloud platforms and Smart grid systems. The Smart City initiative is funded by China and implemented by Huawei and ZTE under the China Zambia Security Cooperation. Part of the Smart City projects is the Safe City initiative. This report examines these initiatives, their surveillance potential and the implications for digital rights.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Sarah Chiumbu
February 2022
Zambia has embarked on smart city projects. The government has established a three-phase project towards reaching the smart city status: establishment of national data and cloud capabilities; creation of advanced digital communication infrastructure, and putting in place Cloud platforms and Smart grid systems. The Smart City initiative is funded by China and implemented by Huawei and ZTE under the China Zambia Security Cooperation. Part of the Smart City projects is the Safe City initiative. This report examines these initiatives, their surveillance potential and the implications for digital rights.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| zambia_report.pdf |
Mapping Digital Surveillance and Privacy Concerns in Malawi
Author: Jimmy Kainja
February 2022
This research report maps digital surveillance and privacy concerns in Malawi. It concentrates on the potential and real human rights implications of the country’s privacy and data protection legislation, especially in view of implementation of some data centralisation programmes in the absence of robust data protection laws. The author used qualitative research methods, combining document and policy analysis as research methods. The author also interviewed key stakeholders, including civil society, media practitioners and IT experts.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Jimmy Kainja
February 2022
This research report maps digital surveillance and privacy concerns in Malawi. It concentrates on the potential and real human rights implications of the country’s privacy and data protection legislation, especially in view of implementation of some data centralisation programmes in the absence of robust data protection laws. The author used qualitative research methods, combining document and policy analysis as research methods. The author also interviewed key stakeholders, including civil society, media practitioners and IT experts.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| malawi_report.pdf |
About secrecy: a quick guide for journalists about state surveillance in South Africa
Author: Heidi Swart
November 2021
South Africa's intelligence services have a history of misusing technology to eavesdrop for reasons that have nothing to do with fighting crime or preserving national security. Inheriting a dysfunctional apartheid intelligence apparatus, a secret and seemingly bottomless funding source, and a disregard for the Constitution contributed to the development of intelligence organisations willing to do the bidding of political factions and squander state funds to acquire private assets without regard for the law. The illegal interception of communications is part and parcel of this culture that has flourished since before the dawn of South Africa's young democracy.
With this guide, we hope to provide you with a brief yet comprehensive overview of why interception of personal information and communications takes place, where it goes wrong, what the technology entails, and what needs to change in South Africa's intelligence structures and regulatory instruments. After reading the guide, you will have a basic knowledge of:
Download the full PDF version of the guide here: CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD
Author: Heidi Swart
November 2021
South Africa's intelligence services have a history of misusing technology to eavesdrop for reasons that have nothing to do with fighting crime or preserving national security. Inheriting a dysfunctional apartheid intelligence apparatus, a secret and seemingly bottomless funding source, and a disregard for the Constitution contributed to the development of intelligence organisations willing to do the bidding of political factions and squander state funds to acquire private assets without regard for the law. The illegal interception of communications is part and parcel of this culture that has flourished since before the dawn of South Africa's young democracy.
With this guide, we hope to provide you with a brief yet comprehensive overview of why interception of personal information and communications takes place, where it goes wrong, what the technology entails, and what needs to change in South Africa's intelligence structures and regulatory instruments. After reading the guide, you will have a basic knowledge of:
- Why governments spy, and how easy it is to spy for the wrong reasons
- What communications governments can intercept (everything!)
- What technology is available to identify people and track their movements
- What major interception and tracking technologies are available to South Africa's intelligence agencies, and how they work
- The role of the private sector in the proliferation of surveillance and interception technology
- What South Africa's intelligence organisations are supposed to do
- The major issues around laws governing state surveillance and interception of communications and private data in South Africa
- Why the intelligence services in South Africa have become corrupt
- How to safeguard your electronic communications Potential story ideas about intelligence services, interception and surveillance
Download the full PDF version of the guide here: CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD
Electronic surveillance in Mozambique: The risks and suspicions in a context of authoritarianism and military conflict
Author: Ernesto Nhanale
May 2021
The political context, marked by an authoritarian culture of control and restrictions of freedoms as well as recurrent military conflicts, has constituted a fertile environment to substantiate suspicions about electronic surveillance in Mozambique. This report, based on desk research and interviews with several politicians and human rights activists in Mozambique, shows some of the mechanisms under which the State is suspected to perform the electronic surveillance that was established during the post-independence period, where, with the adoption of the party-state model, various surveillance mechanisms were institutionalised in order to control the various risks of contestation and subversion against the “regime”, as well as emerging political and military conflicts.
The report shows how surveillance emerges from the political culture of the formally authoritarian state (1977-1990) and continues as a practice in the context of multiparty democracy (since the
1990s), using, in the last 20 years, the development and expansion of electronic communication networks – mobile phones and the internet – as mechanisms of social and political control, in contexts where the state continues to face military conflicts. In addition to serving the useful purpose of ensuring security, the culture of repression of civil liberties, the qualification of differentiated opinion as political enmity of the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) party government, as well as the weaknesses of the laws protecting citizens’ data, mean that most of the technological measures and systems introduced are viewed with the suspicion of serving the interests of espionage by the government.
The cases of installation of public security cameras, the compulsory registration of SIM cards and a series of other measures introduced by the government, rather than serving the useful purpose of guaranteeing security, fighting crime and insurgency, instead substantiate citizens’ perceptions that the state is using them to spy on citizens, thereby violating their fundamental rights such as privacy and freedom of expression.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Ernesto Nhanale
May 2021
The political context, marked by an authoritarian culture of control and restrictions of freedoms as well as recurrent military conflicts, has constituted a fertile environment to substantiate suspicions about electronic surveillance in Mozambique. This report, based on desk research and interviews with several politicians and human rights activists in Mozambique, shows some of the mechanisms under which the State is suspected to perform the electronic surveillance that was established during the post-independence period, where, with the adoption of the party-state model, various surveillance mechanisms were institutionalised in order to control the various risks of contestation and subversion against the “regime”, as well as emerging political and military conflicts.
The report shows how surveillance emerges from the political culture of the formally authoritarian state (1977-1990) and continues as a practice in the context of multiparty democracy (since the
1990s), using, in the last 20 years, the development and expansion of electronic communication networks – mobile phones and the internet – as mechanisms of social and political control, in contexts where the state continues to face military conflicts. In addition to serving the useful purpose of ensuring security, the culture of repression of civil liberties, the qualification of differentiated opinion as political enmity of the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) party government, as well as the weaknesses of the laws protecting citizens’ data, mean that most of the technological measures and systems introduced are viewed with the suspicion of serving the interests of espionage by the government.
The cases of installation of public security cameras, the compulsory registration of SIM cards and a series of other measures introduced by the government, rather than serving the useful purpose of guaranteeing security, fighting crime and insurgency, instead substantiate citizens’ perceptions that the state is using them to spy on citizens, thereby violating their fundamental rights such as privacy and freedom of expression.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| report_04_2021_electronic_surveillance_mozambique_masterset.pdf |
Words and actions: A realistic enquiry into digital surveillance in contemporary Angola
Author: Rui Verde
May 2021
In recent times, the Angolan event with the greatest global impact has been the news item, the “Luanda Leaks” (Freedberg et al., 2020), which made public a series of allegedly irregular actions of Isabel dos Santos, the richest woman in Africa and the daughter of Angola’s former president. The official version was that the documents published in the report were obtained through a Portuguese hacker, Rui Pinto. However, Isabel dos Santos argued that the documentation was collected by Angola’s security services through a digital surveillance operation (dos Santos, 2020).
This is an example of the paramount relevance of electronic surveillance in today’s Angolan political, economic and social life. In Angola, there is near paranoia about the issue of digital surveillance. The development of a proper legal framework to protect people’s civil rights and privacy has been extremely difficult in Angola. For a long time, pertinent legislation did not exist to any great extent or was anachronistic. In 2010, though, a new constitution was approved that contained restrictions on the use of digital surveillance.
By delving into legislative history and facts, this paper analyses the evolution of digital surveillance in Angola since 1992, comparing the normative intentions and actuality. It examines two trends that are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, there is a constitutional restriction on digital surveillance and some emerging legislation enforcing such restriction, but on the other hand such restriction is confronted by numerous and sustained cases of uncurbed digital surveillance. These conflicting realities indicate that there is a large gap between the legal norms in Angola and what is really happening on the ground. This survey has attempted to gauge the breadth of such a gap.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Rui Verde
May 2021
In recent times, the Angolan event with the greatest global impact has been the news item, the “Luanda Leaks” (Freedberg et al., 2020), which made public a series of allegedly irregular actions of Isabel dos Santos, the richest woman in Africa and the daughter of Angola’s former president. The official version was that the documents published in the report were obtained through a Portuguese hacker, Rui Pinto. However, Isabel dos Santos argued that the documentation was collected by Angola’s security services through a digital surveillance operation (dos Santos, 2020).
This is an example of the paramount relevance of electronic surveillance in today’s Angolan political, economic and social life. In Angola, there is near paranoia about the issue of digital surveillance. The development of a proper legal framework to protect people’s civil rights and privacy has been extremely difficult in Angola. For a long time, pertinent legislation did not exist to any great extent or was anachronistic. In 2010, though, a new constitution was approved that contained restrictions on the use of digital surveillance.
By delving into legislative history and facts, this paper analyses the evolution of digital surveillance in Angola since 1992, comparing the normative intentions and actuality. It examines two trends that are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, there is a constitutional restriction on digital surveillance and some emerging legislation enforcing such restriction, but on the other hand such restriction is confronted by numerous and sustained cases of uncurbed digital surveillance. These conflicting realities indicate that there is a large gap between the legal norms in Angola and what is really happening on the ground. This survey has attempted to gauge the breadth of such a gap.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| report_03_2021_words_and_actions_angola_masterset.pdf |
The growth of military-driven surveillance in post-2000 Zimbabwe
Author: Allen Munoriyarwa
May 2021
Zimbabwe’s long-time ruler, Robert Mugabe, was deposed by a military coup in November 2017.
This was a culmination of a long succession feud between Mugabe and his erstwhile ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa, now the current president. Eventually, the military sided with the latter. The deposition of Mugabe highlighted the centrality of the military in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial politics. It was clear that the gun would lead the politics. The military had once more become the arbiter of Zimbabwe’s politics, like they did in 2008, when they pushed Mugabe to refuse defeat. That the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) is a powerful political entity is now beyond doubt (Tendi, 2019). The strength of the military has been enabled by a number of factors. These include, access to financial resources through generous budgetary allocations from the treasury.
This report tells us about the growth of military-driven surveillance in Zimbabwe, which raises specific issues with regards to human rights. Because it is not provided for in the constitution, there is now an obvious danger that this practice is politicised. When it is politicised, it can lead to suppression and repression of anti-government voices. This in itself is a human rights abuse issue that cannot be tolerated in countries calling themselves democracies. There are also other questions. For example, what happens to the data after use?
The move towards military-driven surveillance confirms that surveillance in the country is a political, not a crime-fighting, practice. Thus, one can argue that post-coup Zimbabwe has become one side of the same coin with the Mugabe regime. The difference, based on the evidence, might be that post-coup Zimbabwe has witnessed hardening digital authoritarianism driven by the military. A heavy reliance on China might, possibly mean data ends up in China, in exchange for surveillance technology, giving China an opportunity to use the data to train its technologies.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Allen Munoriyarwa
May 2021
Zimbabwe’s long-time ruler, Robert Mugabe, was deposed by a military coup in November 2017.
This was a culmination of a long succession feud between Mugabe and his erstwhile ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa, now the current president. Eventually, the military sided with the latter. The deposition of Mugabe highlighted the centrality of the military in Zimbabwe’s postcolonial politics. It was clear that the gun would lead the politics. The military had once more become the arbiter of Zimbabwe’s politics, like they did in 2008, when they pushed Mugabe to refuse defeat. That the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) is a powerful political entity is now beyond doubt (Tendi, 2019). The strength of the military has been enabled by a number of factors. These include, access to financial resources through generous budgetary allocations from the treasury.
This report tells us about the growth of military-driven surveillance in Zimbabwe, which raises specific issues with regards to human rights. Because it is not provided for in the constitution, there is now an obvious danger that this practice is politicised. When it is politicised, it can lead to suppression and repression of anti-government voices. This in itself is a human rights abuse issue that cannot be tolerated in countries calling themselves democracies. There are also other questions. For example, what happens to the data after use?
The move towards military-driven surveillance confirms that surveillance in the country is a political, not a crime-fighting, practice. Thus, one can argue that post-coup Zimbabwe has become one side of the same coin with the Mugabe regime. The difference, based on the evidence, might be that post-coup Zimbabwe has witnessed hardening digital authoritarianism driven by the military. A heavy reliance on China might, possibly mean data ends up in China, in exchange for surveillance technology, giving China an opportunity to use the data to train its technologies.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| report_01_2021_military_driven_surveillance_zimbabwe_masterset.pdf |
Surveillance of public spaces and communications in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Author: Arsène Tungali
May 2021
This report is about the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the second largest country on the Africa continent, with nearly 85 million inhabitants. It draws attention to the practice of surveillance, focusing on surveillance conducted over public spaces as well as surveillance of personal communications.
Using a qualitative approach that included a literature review, policy and legal analysis as well as key personal interviews, this report aims to analyse the practice of surveillance in the DRC in terms of the law. It presents the legal environment as well as specific provisions in the law that do or do not justify these practices. It then looks at the main actors or state agencies involved in surveillance practices, and speaks about some of those actors and entities considered as targets of surveillance.
This report also provides facts on how telecom companies are participating in the surveillance of DRC citizens’ personal communications. It also tries to understand the actual practice of surveillance versus available legal provisions, verifying the assumption that says there is generally a disjuncturebetween the two in many countries.
Based on the findings of the research, the report concludes by presenting specific recommendations to different stakeholders, namely the government, the Parliament, civil society groups, and telecommunication companies, on how surveillance can best be used, while caring for citizens’ rights, including their right to privacy.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
Author: Arsène Tungali
May 2021
This report is about the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the second largest country on the Africa continent, with nearly 85 million inhabitants. It draws attention to the practice of surveillance, focusing on surveillance conducted over public spaces as well as surveillance of personal communications.
Using a qualitative approach that included a literature review, policy and legal analysis as well as key personal interviews, this report aims to analyse the practice of surveillance in the DRC in terms of the law. It presents the legal environment as well as specific provisions in the law that do or do not justify these practices. It then looks at the main actors or state agencies involved in surveillance practices, and speaks about some of those actors and entities considered as targets of surveillance.
This report also provides facts on how telecom companies are participating in the surveillance of DRC citizens’ personal communications. It also tries to understand the actual practice of surveillance versus available legal provisions, verifying the assumption that says there is generally a disjuncturebetween the two in many countries.
Based on the findings of the research, the report concludes by presenting specific recommendations to different stakeholders, namely the government, the Parliament, civil society groups, and telecommunication companies, on how surveillance can best be used, while caring for citizens’ rights, including their right to privacy.
Download the full PDF version of the report here:
| report_02_2021_surveillance_of_public_spaces_drc_masterset.pdf |
Track and trace, trial and error. Assessing South Africa's approaches to privacy in Covid-19 digital contact tracing
Author: Murray Hunter
3 December 2020
Digital contact tracing has been at the centre of global concerns about privacy and digital rights during the Covid-19 pandemic.
In March 2020, South Africa joined dozens of other countries in looking for sophisticated technological solutions to aid its contact-tracing efforts, with an ambitious if misguided attempt to use locational data from mobile-network operators to help ‘track and trace’ people with the virus.
While the programme was misconceived – officials abandoned the attempt to use cellular data for contact tracing after just a few weeks – it did yield a novel set of privacy protections designed to ensure oversight and safeguard against its misuse.
In doing so, South Africa appeared in one way to eschew a common global narrative about privacy in the pandemic: that crises provoke emergency powers that are only ever excessive, expansive and ever-lasting.
Since then, South Africa’s health authorities’ evolving approach to contact tracing has shifted to a range of other digital interventions that seem more carefully considered, but that have often been put into effect with little public consultation and haphazard transparency.
This report attempts to piece together a public record (albeit incomplete) of how the initial digital contact-tracing policy was created, why it failed, and what came next. In doing so it gives a first assessment of some the privacy and data protection issues that emerged, and a critical reflection on the challenges of policy making in a time of crisis, where well-intentioned officials grapple with complex problems under immense pressure.
Download the full PDF version of this report here
Author: Murray Hunter
3 December 2020
Digital contact tracing has been at the centre of global concerns about privacy and digital rights during the Covid-19 pandemic.
In March 2020, South Africa joined dozens of other countries in looking for sophisticated technological solutions to aid its contact-tracing efforts, with an ambitious if misguided attempt to use locational data from mobile-network operators to help ‘track and trace’ people with the virus.
While the programme was misconceived – officials abandoned the attempt to use cellular data for contact tracing after just a few weeks – it did yield a novel set of privacy protections designed to ensure oversight and safeguard against its misuse.
In doing so, South Africa appeared in one way to eschew a common global narrative about privacy in the pandemic: that crises provoke emergency powers that are only ever excessive, expansive and ever-lasting.
Since then, South Africa’s health authorities’ evolving approach to contact tracing has shifted to a range of other digital interventions that seem more carefully considered, but that have often been put into effect with little public consultation and haphazard transparency.
This report attempts to piece together a public record (albeit incomplete) of how the initial digital contact-tracing policy was created, why it failed, and what came next. In doing so it gives a first assessment of some the privacy and data protection issues that emerged, and a critical reflection on the challenges of policy making in a time of crisis, where well-intentioned officials grapple with complex problems under immense pressure.
Download the full PDF version of this report here
| track-and-trace-digital_contact-tracing-in-sa-nov-2020.pdf |
Video Surveillance in Southern Africa. Case studies of security camera systems in the region
Authors: Main report by Heidi Swart, Zimbabwe chapter by Allen Munoriyarwa
28 May 2020
The growth in the surveillance of public spaces is a global phenomenon, and Southern Africa is no exception. Increased bandwidth has made it possible for governments, corporates, and private entities to purchase sophisticated, high-definition, Internet-based cameras, creating risks to data protection and other human rights and freedoms. However, little formal research has been done to establish the reach and capabilities of these surveillance systems in this region. This study attempts to address this knowledge gap, focusing on case studies in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Angola.
The report notes that each of these countries are headed in the same direction: AI-powered surveillance, with features like facial recognition and a variety of other video analytics, often with the assistance of international industrial partners, in particular from China.
Citizens, civic group, journalists, and academics in countries should take stock of the implications of the current growth of AI video surveillance on their human rights, and plan accordingly.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
Authors: Main report by Heidi Swart, Zimbabwe chapter by Allen Munoriyarwa
28 May 2020
The growth in the surveillance of public spaces is a global phenomenon, and Southern Africa is no exception. Increased bandwidth has made it possible for governments, corporates, and private entities to purchase sophisticated, high-definition, Internet-based cameras, creating risks to data protection and other human rights and freedoms. However, little formal research has been done to establish the reach and capabilities of these surveillance systems in this region. This study attempts to address this knowledge gap, focusing on case studies in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Angola.
The report notes that each of these countries are headed in the same direction: AI-powered surveillance, with features like facial recognition and a variety of other video analytics, often with the assistance of international industrial partners, in particular from China.
Citizens, civic group, journalists, and academics in countries should take stock of the implications of the current growth of AI video surveillance on their human rights, and plan accordingly.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
| video_surveillance_in_southern_africa_-_security_camera_systems_in_the_region.pdf |
A Patchwork for Privacy. Mapping communications surveillance laws in southern Africa
Authors: Murray Hunter and Admire Mare
26 May 2020
This research attempts to map out basic features of communications surveillance laws in 12 southern African countries, to assess the extent to which the legal frameworks for digital surveillance meet or fall short of international best practice. This is an attempt to address an information gap in surveillance studies, which tend to focus more on the global north. As the digitisation of African societies progresses, understanding and mapping out the frameworks for communications surveillance is an increasingly important part of assessing the climate for democratic engagement in these countries.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the research reveals a dispiriting picture. Across the region, governments appear to exercising intrusive spying powers with insufficient limitations or safeguards. In particular, communications metadata (information about a person’s communications, rather than the content of their communications) is left with little legal protection. In several countries, the state’s surveillance powers are not subject to approval by a judge, eschewing the most basic standard for independent oversight. In some parts of the region, governments have exercised these intrusive powers with no legal framework in place; others have legal frameworks full of overlaps, conflicts and blind spots. Above all, irrespective of strengths or weaknesses in legal framework, a pattern emerges across the region: states have used their surveillance powers for antidemocratic purposes.
In the context of global debates on privacy and the growing realisation of the importance of communications privacy in democratic participation, the aim of this research is to contribute to an understanding of the basic features of the interception laws for each country in southern African. This can form the basis for ongoing research and democratic reforms, to build a better foundation for communication rights in the region.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
Authors: Murray Hunter and Admire Mare
26 May 2020
This research attempts to map out basic features of communications surveillance laws in 12 southern African countries, to assess the extent to which the legal frameworks for digital surveillance meet or fall short of international best practice. This is an attempt to address an information gap in surveillance studies, which tend to focus more on the global north. As the digitisation of African societies progresses, understanding and mapping out the frameworks for communications surveillance is an increasingly important part of assessing the climate for democratic engagement in these countries.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the research reveals a dispiriting picture. Across the region, governments appear to exercising intrusive spying powers with insufficient limitations or safeguards. In particular, communications metadata (information about a person’s communications, rather than the content of their communications) is left with little legal protection. In several countries, the state’s surveillance powers are not subject to approval by a judge, eschewing the most basic standard for independent oversight. In some parts of the region, governments have exercised these intrusive powers with no legal framework in place; others have legal frameworks full of overlaps, conflicts and blind spots. Above all, irrespective of strengths or weaknesses in legal framework, a pattern emerges across the region: states have used their surveillance powers for antidemocratic purposes.
In the context of global debates on privacy and the growing realisation of the importance of communications privacy in democratic participation, the aim of this research is to contribute to an understanding of the basic features of the interception laws for each country in southern African. This can form the basis for ongoing research and democratic reforms, to build a better foundation for communication rights in the region.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
| patchwork_for_privacy_-_communication_surveillance_in_southern_africa.pdf |
Cops and call records. Policing and metadata privacy in South Africa
Author: Murray Hunter
27 March 2020
Privacy laws often disregard the sensitivity of communication metadata – information about who a person communicates with, and how, where and when they do it. Yet this information often reveals as much or about that person, than the contents of the communication itself.
Certainly South Africa’s laws have disregarded metadata privacy. While the weaknesses in the main surveillance law, RICA, face growing criticism, most police investigations of people’s communications use a separate avenue: the ‘Section 205’ procedure, which allow the police to seize a person’s phone records or other communications metadata, with few safeguards or limits.
This research draws on interviews with current and former law enforcement officials, to assess how police use these ‘Section 205’ metadata requests, and to sketch out possible reform options that would increase privacy protections for communication metadata.
While security officials have publicly painted reform proposals as being fatal to policing, these interviews show a surprising diversity of views within law enforcement structures, and map out some of the terrain for possible reforms.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
Author: Murray Hunter
27 March 2020
Privacy laws often disregard the sensitivity of communication metadata – information about who a person communicates with, and how, where and when they do it. Yet this information often reveals as much or about that person, than the contents of the communication itself.
Certainly South Africa’s laws have disregarded metadata privacy. While the weaknesses in the main surveillance law, RICA, face growing criticism, most police investigations of people’s communications use a separate avenue: the ‘Section 205’ procedure, which allow the police to seize a person’s phone records or other communications metadata, with few safeguards or limits.
This research draws on interviews with current and former law enforcement officials, to assess how police use these ‘Section 205’ metadata requests, and to sketch out possible reform options that would increase privacy protections for communication metadata.
While security officials have publicly painted reform proposals as being fatal to policing, these interviews show a surprising diversity of views within law enforcement structures, and map out some of the terrain for possible reforms.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
| cops_and_call_records_web_masterset_26_march.pdf |
Drifting Towards Darkness: An Exploratory Study of State Surveillance in Post-2000 Zimbabwe
Media Policy and Democracy Project
31 October 2019
This is an exploratory study that seeks to document surveillance practices in Zimbabwe. It explores the characteristics of state surveillance in Zimbabwe. It maps out the Zimbabwean context of surveillance by focusing on the following two broad areas of surveillance:
The revelations of mass surveillance by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden confirmed peoples’ fears that state surveillance is a common practice that has been going on for some time. The revelations also confirm that arbitrary state surveillance has been on-going including in countries which say they uphold the right to privacy it is argued that state surveillance may be worse in countries like Zimbabwe, traditionally perceived as authoritarian states (Makumbe 2009). State surveillance often targets critical constituencies like opposition parties, NGOs, CSOs and investigative journalists (Haggerty 2009). Readily available surveillance technologies from countries like China and Iran, and the latter’s willingness to assist countries establish extra-legal surveillance strategies (Evans 2013) necessitate a need to explore the extent of surveillance in countries like Zimbabwe, that have, for long been allies of China in Africa (Sachikonye 2012). The reports of growing surveillance capabilities (to be explained later), of the state in Zimbabwe has not, arguably, been matched by a response from CSOs, NGOs, HRL, and other players interested in fending off encroaching extralegal surveillance.
This research therefore, seeks to first establish the extent of the Zimbabwe’s state surveillance capabilities. This is very important if interested parties are to be mobilised towards a united response to counter privacy violating surveillance practices by the state.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
Media Policy and Democracy Project
31 October 2019
This is an exploratory study that seeks to document surveillance practices in Zimbabwe. It explores the characteristics of state surveillance in Zimbabwe. It maps out the Zimbabwean context of surveillance by focusing on the following two broad areas of surveillance:
- Public space surveillance in Zimbabwe
- Communication surveillance in Zimbabwe
The revelations of mass surveillance by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden confirmed peoples’ fears that state surveillance is a common practice that has been going on for some time. The revelations also confirm that arbitrary state surveillance has been on-going including in countries which say they uphold the right to privacy it is argued that state surveillance may be worse in countries like Zimbabwe, traditionally perceived as authoritarian states (Makumbe 2009). State surveillance often targets critical constituencies like opposition parties, NGOs, CSOs and investigative journalists (Haggerty 2009). Readily available surveillance technologies from countries like China and Iran, and the latter’s willingness to assist countries establish extra-legal surveillance strategies (Evans 2013) necessitate a need to explore the extent of surveillance in countries like Zimbabwe, that have, for long been allies of China in Africa (Sachikonye 2012). The reports of growing surveillance capabilities (to be explained later), of the state in Zimbabwe has not, arguably, been matched by a response from CSOs, NGOs, HRL, and other players interested in fending off encroaching extralegal surveillance.
This research therefore, seeks to first establish the extent of the Zimbabwe’s state surveillance capabilities. This is very important if interested parties are to be mobilised towards a united response to counter privacy violating surveillance practices by the state.
Download the full PDF version of this report here:
| zimbabwe_report_2nd_pages.pdf |
Communication Surveillance In Namibia: An Exploratory Study
Author: Admire Mare
31 October 2020
This mapping study sought to explore the emerging practices and cultures around communication surveillance in Namibia. The study attempts to shed light on the surveillance technologies used to spy on people, their capacities, the targets of surveillance and the ways in which civil society organisations are pushing back against the normalisation of surveillance in post-apartheid Namibia.
It endeavoured to find out if Namibia can be characterised as a “surveillance state” with the capacity to use data-driven surveillance technologies to monitor the everyday lives of ordinary citizens and perceived political ‘enemies’.
The study will also focus on the following areas:
Deploying a combination of qualitative policy analysis, document analysis and in-depth interviews with key informants drawn from professional journalists, civil society, Windhoek City Police and regulatory authorities, the study revealed that there are a number of reasons to believe that unlawful communication surveillance is occurring in Namibia.
Download the full PDF version of this report here
Author: Admire Mare
31 October 2020
This mapping study sought to explore the emerging practices and cultures around communication surveillance in Namibia. The study attempts to shed light on the surveillance technologies used to spy on people, their capacities, the targets of surveillance and the ways in which civil society organisations are pushing back against the normalisation of surveillance in post-apartheid Namibia.
It endeavoured to find out if Namibia can be characterised as a “surveillance state” with the capacity to use data-driven surveillance technologies to monitor the everyday lives of ordinary citizens and perceived political ‘enemies’.
The study will also focus on the following areas:
- Namibia and the global trade in data-driven surveillance tools, focusing particularly on the growing influence of China;
- The adequacy of oversight of these forms of surveillance;
- Capabilities of the institutions undertaking these forms of surveillance and their uses;
- Building the capacities of civil society to hold these institutions accountable, through research and investigative journalism.
Deploying a combination of qualitative policy analysis, document analysis and in-depth interviews with key informants drawn from professional journalists, civil society, Windhoek City Police and regulatory authorities, the study revealed that there are a number of reasons to believe that unlawful communication surveillance is occurring in Namibia.
Download the full PDF version of this report here
| namibia_report_3rd_pages.pdf |
The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OFS-SA) provided funding to the MPDP for a year-long research project of the state of communications surveillance in South Africa. The purpose of the project was to investigate whether South Africa’s surveillance laws, policies and practices were in line with international human rights principles. We were particularly keen to establish if they conformed to a set of principles drafted by international civil society organisations, called ‘The international principles on the application of human rights principles to communications surveillance’, or ‘The Necessary and Proportionate Principles’, which are available here.
The research will be used by civil society, unions and social movements to campaign for changes to laws and policies governing communications surveillance where necessary, to ensure that these secretive areas of the state are transparent and accountable.
The research includes two papers by Admire Mare: one assessing South Africa’s communications law and policy and the extent to which it measures up to the ‘Necessary and Proportionate Principles’, and one on how journalists, academics, lawyers and civic activists are adapting to and resisting communications surveillance, or the threat of it. These papers were used as a basis for the development of a handbook, for public awareness and advocacy purposes, drafted by Dale McKinley. The MPDP also commissioned Heidi Swart to undertake investigative journalism on communications surveillance in South Africa.
The research will be used by civil society, unions and social movements to campaign for changes to laws and policies governing communications surveillance where necessary, to ensure that these secretive areas of the state are transparent and accountable.
The research includes two papers by Admire Mare: one assessing South Africa’s communications law and policy and the extent to which it measures up to the ‘Necessary and Proportionate Principles’, and one on how journalists, academics, lawyers and civic activists are adapting to and resisting communications surveillance, or the threat of it. These papers were used as a basis for the development of a handbook, for public awareness and advocacy purposes, drafted by Dale McKinley. The MPDP also commissioned Heidi Swart to undertake investigative journalism on communications surveillance in South Africa.
The papers are available here:
Heidi Swart, 'Communications surveillance by the South African Intelligence Services'.
Heidi Swart, 'Communications surveillance by the South African Intelligence Services'.
| comms-surveillance-nia-swart_feb2016.pdf |
Admire Mare, ‘An analysis of the communications surveillance legislative framework in South Africa’.
| comms-surveillance-framework_mare2.pdf |
Admire Mare, ‘A qualitative analysis of how investigative journalists, civic activists, lawyers and academics are adapting to and resisting communications surveillance in South Africa’.
| duncan_2_comm_surveillance.pdf |
The handbook is available here:
Dale McKinley, ‘The surveillance state: communications surveillance and privacy in South Africa’.
Dale McKinley, ‘The surveillance state: communications surveillance and privacy in South Africa’.
| sa_surveillancestate-web.pdf |
Privacy International: State of Privacy in South Africa
The State of Privacy and Surveillance in South Africa report is the result of an ongoing collaboration between Privacy International, the Right2Know Campaign and the Media Policy and Democracy Project.
The full report is available here
The State of Privacy and Surveillance in South Africa report is the result of an ongoing collaboration between Privacy International, the Right2Know Campaign and the Media Policy and Democracy Project.
The full report is available here
New Terrains of Privacy in South Africa: Biometrics/Smart Identification Systems, CCTV/ALPR, Drones, Mandatory SIM Card Registration and Fica
Author: Dr Dale T. McKinley
This monograph was produced as part of a collaborative research project between the Right2Know Campaign and the Media Policy and Democracy Project.
Read more and download the full report here.
Author: Dr Dale T. McKinley
This monograph was produced as part of a collaborative research project between the Right2Know Campaign and the Media Policy and Democracy Project.
Read more and download the full report here.
| r2kmpdp_new_terrains_of_privacy_in_south__africa_masterset_small.pdf |
